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Political competitiveness  which many interpret as the degree of democracy  can be modeled as
a monopolistic competition.  All regimes are constrained by the threat of "entry," and thereby seek
some combination of popular support and political entry barriers.  This simple model predicts that
many public policies are unrelated to political competitiveness, and that even unchallenged nondemocratic
regimes should tax far short of their Laffer curve maximum.  Economic sanctions, odious debt repudiation,
and other policies designed to punish dictators can have the unintended consequences of increasing
oppression and discouraging competition.  Since entry barriers are a form of increasing returns, democratic
countries (defined according to low entry barriers) are more likely to subdivide and nondemocratic
countries are more likely to merge.  These and other predictions are consistent with previous empirical
findings on comparative public finance, election contests, international conflict, the size of nations,
and the Lipset hypothesis.  As in the private sector, the number of competitors is not necessarily a
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What determines the organization and conduct of the public sector?  To what degree can
poverty, human rights violations, war, and other world problems be attributed to frictions in the
political process?  Why, exactly?  Will China become democratic and, if so, how will that affect the
welfare of the Chinese people?  When it comes to designing the new constitutions in Iraq and the
European Union, are political freedoms or electoral rules more important?  Game theory and other
economic tools have been usefully applied to some of these questions, demonstrating, for example,
the potential impacts of tastes, technology, and electoral rules on public policy.  Our goal is to
further explore the political determinants of policy, by focusing on the degree of competition for
political leadership, while paying little attention to the means of competition (e.g., electoral rules,
or even whether there are regular elections).  We show how the degree of competition affects public
policy, and responds to economic changes.  Interestingly, political competitiveness may have little
effect on a wide range of economic and social policies, like the mix of taxes, or spending on Social
Security.  Instead, competitiveness is reflected by policies like military spending, torture, and
execution, which more directly serve to protect the incumbent leader’s position.  By focusing on
competitiveness, it is easy to see how trade sanctions and other policies designed to promote
democracy may actually have the unintended consequences of increasing oppression and
discouraging competition.  We offer economic interpretations of why democratic countries are
observed to be more peaceful, and more likely to separate into smaller countries.  We give economic
interpretations of the variety of empirical measures of democracy published in the political science
and economic literatures.
Entry barriers are widely discussed in political science, with a large section of comparative
political science concerned with measuring them.  For example, even though Singapore has
elections, and candidates for public office can speak their minds on policy issues, the country isPolitical Competitiveness – 2
1See, for example, the Parliamentary Elections Act, the Films Act, and the Defamation
Act at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/
2Perfect competition is typically assumed in models in which public policies are
determined by universal voting or economic efficiency.  The monopoly models of government
include Breton (1974), Brennan and Buchanan (1980), and Olson (1993).
3Crain (1977), Lott (1986), Wohlgemuth (1999), and Tsui (2002) are also studies of
public sector entry barriers, although these studies put relatively more emphasis on structure than
conduct and performance.
4The POLITY IV (2000) project rated 5,409 country-years, which covered practically all
of the world’s population, during the period 1960-99 in terms of the competitiveness of political
participation and executive recruitment.  Only 1,139 of them (21%) scored perfectly in terms of
competitiveness.
5See Becker (1958, p. 108), Wohlgemuth (1999, p. 183), Myerson (1999, p. 684-91), and
Persson and Tabellini (2003, pp. 24, 27)  for further examples of entry barriers in (so-called)
“democracies,” including vote quotas and other electoral rules that make entry difficult. 
Electoral incumbency advantage may be the result of such entry barriers. 
usually graded as hardly competitive (a.k.a., “nondemocratic”) because, among other things, the
government has the discretion to determine whether a candidate is speaking about policy rather than
defaming the government leadership (the latter is illegal).
1   However, formal models in economics
and political science usually consider only one of two extremes: perfect competition (no entry
barriers) or no competition of any kind.
2  We help fill this gap by building a model of the causes and
consequences of a variety of autocracies and democracies, with some unanticipated applications and
results.
3 
Observation suggests that there may be no ideal democracy on earth, in the sense that anyone
can costlessly enter the competition for public office.  According to the POLITY IV (2000) indices
of political competitiveness, at least 80% of the world, and 94% of the nonOECD countries, are
imperfectly competitive in terms of the selection of political leaders, or in terms of the degree to
which alternative views on policy and leadership can be expressed in the political arena.
4  80% is
probably an underestimate of the prevalence of imperfectly competitive public sectors: Djankov et
al. (2003) report that government dominates the television broadcast market (measured by
viewership) in Western Europe, even though POLITY indicated no imperfection for a single one of
these sixteen countries.
5  At the same time, few (if any) polities are fully monopolized, because evenPolitical Competitiveness – 3
6Speer (1970) notes the Hitler “regime's anxiety not to risk any shift in the popular
mood,” even as compared with democratic England (p. 214)  Other examples include Hitler’s
practices of keeping taxes invisible (pp. 87, 140), and keeping electoral rules intact (p. 152). 
Barzel’s (2000) also has a model of the tradeoff between a dictator’s personal wealth and his
security.
7Wittman (1995) adapted private sector competitive theory to the public sector in order to
formulate a theory of (ideal) democratic performance.  Our paper pushes Wittman’s private-
public analogy beyond the purely competitive case.
8See also Demsetz (1968).
9See Baye and Hoppe (2003) for formal analogies between rent seeking contests and
patent-races games.
the most oppressive regimes show some sensitivity to popular support, and some concern that a lack
of popular support would hurt the regime’s survival and effectiveness.
6 
Unlike a typical firm that shares a market with his competitors in an industry, government
has long been understood as a natural monopoly on force.  However, Schumpeter (1942), Becker
(1958), and Tullock (1965) explained how government may only be a monopoly in a static sense,
and an ideal democracy regularly has perfect competition for the right to run the monopoly until the
next election.
7  In this regard, government has something in common with a regulated public utility.
For example, only one firm at a time can deliver electricity, but the firm doing so may compete with
others for the job, perhaps via a license auction, by pleasing a regulator who answers to the voters,
etc.
8  We interpret the degree of political (non)competitiveness as the size of entry barriers into the
process allocating the rights to temporarily run the government, or the natural monopoly on force.
Such a dynamic political competition also resembles a sequential patent race (Reinganum
1985), in which firms exert R&D effort in innovation competition and a successful firm can enjoy
temporary monopoly power granted by the patent until he is “overthrown” by another more
inventive challenger.  Our section II therefore begins with a simple model of imperfect political
competition, akin to a patent race.
9  Rents are created and limited by entry barriers.  As a result,
entry barriers create rent-seeking behavior.  Rents increase less than proportionally with the size of
the market, if at all.  The actual and nominal incidence of foreign policies directed at “monopolized”
political leaders are different, because of their impact on supply conditions.  Similar results for the
private sector are familiar from the industrial organization and public finance literatures, butPolitical Competitiveness – 4
10See also Wohlgemuth (1999, p. 179), and Myerson (1999, p. 684-91).
11Some policy instruments do not necessarily create barriers to entry, but are
complementary with policies that do.  A more detailed analysis would distinguish various
Sections III-V show how they have been neglected in theories of politics, foreign policy, the size
of nations, and international conflict.
Perhaps one difference between a dictator and the manager of a public utility is that the
former has no higher government to enforce agreements between he and his “customers.”  Hence
we suspect that imperfect competition could be more important in the public sector, despite the fact
that imperfect competition models have usually been applied to private sector behaviors.
10  For the
same reason, endogenous entry barriers may be especially important in the public sector.  Our model
thereby begins a theory of democratization, at least if democratization is to be interpreted as a
secular increase in the number of parties seriously competing for public office, or a secular decline
in entry barriers.  Section IV derives the scale effect. Namely, there is a lot at stake in ruling a large
public sector, so an autocrat has a tougher time blocking political entry as the public sector grows,
thereby increasing the gains to entry.  Section V predicts that economic development may or may
not encourage democracy, depending on the nature of the income growth and whether democracy
is measured according to entry barriers, the number of competitors, or  the amount of rent enjoyed
by the political leadership.  
II.  The “Market” for Political Leadership as a Monopolistically Competitive Patent Race with
Endogenous Entry Barriers
Our model has two basic components, which reflect the two concerns of a political leader;
longevity and leadership income.  Public policies are chosen by the leader, and affect both longevity
and income.  We partition public policies into three types: “barriers to entry” policies b, “social and
economic” policies x, and a scalar markup rate m.  Barriers to entry policy instruments, like
execution, torture, the degree of censorship, the organization of the military, ballot fees, vote quotas,
etc., have the primary effect of blocking political competition.  Social and economic policies like
social security, the minimum wage, various rates of taxation, etc., are functionally unrelated to the
blocking of political challengers.  These policies do not affect political competition, except
indirectly by enhancing GDP and/or the government’s popular support.
11 Political Competitiveness – 5
elements of the x vector according to their complementarity with b policies, and vice versa, but
for the moment we suppose that any policy is either in the x vector, or a contributor to b, but not
both.
As with the study of complements and substitutes in consumer and producer theory, the
distinction between x and b should be made on first principles, so that theoretical implications for
x-b co-movements are testable rather than tautological.  Some of these judgements are
straightforward, as it seems that censorship and torture have a much different functional relationship
with blocking political challengers than does, say, the minimum wage rate.  Interestingly, Tullock’s
(1987) book – which is about the measures autocrats take to protect their office – is clear that some
public policies are more important than others when it comes to blocking political challengers: the
death penalty (pp. 6, 20, 65, 80), torture (pp. 61, 62, 64, 65), press freedom (p. 154), regulation of
religion (p. 108), and maintaining an army.  A whole range of public policies, like education
spending, revenue, pension spending, nonpension “social” spending, the corporate tax rate, and
payroll taxation are conspicuously absent from his analysis of entry barriers.  Even if these
judgements turn out to be difficult, the assumption that there are a lot of important policies in the
x vector is enough to generate some interesting results, namely that democracy should not affect
public conduct in many dimensions.
For simplicity, we model the markup as if it were taken in cash.  m is more than corruption,
which is sometimes interpreted as illegal cash receipts by political leaders.  Some leaders receive
their cash legally, as with monarchs with the legal right to sell monopoly licenses, or dictators who
legally pay themselves large salaries or build palaces, summer homes, etc.  Market power permits
leaders to influence public policies for their satisfaction or personal profit, which is legal if the
leader is sufficiently convincing as to the public’s interest in the policy, as with esoteric
appointments to the Supreme Court, presidential pardons, or Alexander Hamilton’s policy of
honoring Revolutionary War debt.  In many cases, part of the markup is spent on entry barrier
maintenance, and it may be perfectly legal to use tax revenue for these purposes, like paying the
military generously or hiring civil servants to monitor and censor the press.Political Competitiveness – 6
II.A.  Supply-Side Determinants of Political Rents: Structure of the Competition and the Zero Profit
Condition
A large pool of identical citizens are potential challengers to the incumbent’s political
leadership.  An actual challenger spends resources b attempting to assemble a winning coalition.
We refer to b as the “political entry barrier”; b includes the punishments (actual or potential),
censorship, and inconveniences created by the incumbent in order to block challenges.  The
challenger proposes a policy, which both determines the profits he would earn if successful and the
amount of popular support he enjoys.  His popular support relative to the incumbent determines his
probability of success.
The incumbent is, of course, concerned with the number and actions of his challengers.  Each
challenger is concerned with the number, and actions of, the other challengers.  More important,
each challenger is challenging because he hopes to take over, and himself someday be the
incumbent.  Hence, he is concerned with the next generation of challengers, whose probabilities of
success will be determined by their policy proposals relative to his.  In other words, by proposing
a popular policy, a challenger lengthens the expected lifetime of his regime in the event he does take
over.  Our political equilibrium has a lot in common with the sequential patent race equilibrium
described by Reinganum (1985); a successful coup is our analogue to winning a patent race.  As
explained by Reinganum, analyzing such an equilibrium naturally uses dynamic programming
methods.
Regimes are indexed t = 0, 1, ..., with 0 denoting the incumbent regime.  When parameters
vary over time, we use subscripts to distinguish one regime’s parameters from another’s.  For
example, bt denotes the entry barrier protecting regime t.  Let’s consider the situation in which the
number of parties challenging regime t is ct.  These challengers are indexed i = 1, 2, ..., ct, and have
success hazards h1t, h2t, ....  Challenger i’s success hazard hit depends on his policies {mi,t+1,bi,t+1,xi,t+1}
and the incumbent’s policies {mt,bt,xt}, but for the moment our notation suppresses this dependence
until we consider the implications of maximizing behavior.
Let N denote population and y GDP per capita, so (1-m)Ny is the amount of GDP kept by
citizens ((1-m)y per capita) and mNy the amount going to the government leadership.  mNy is a
“markup,” and m a “markup rate.”  mNy does not include tax revenues approved by the citizens for
the purposes of public works, public insurance, redistribution from one group of citizens to another,
etc.  In other words, the markup rate m is probably much less than the aggregate tax rate as usuallyPolitical Competitiveness – 7
12β may depend on other exogenous economic and demographic characteristics Θ,
although for simplicity our notation suppresses dependence on Θ.
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measured, because much of the tax revenue may be spent in the public interest, and not for the
pleasure of the leadership.  For the time being, we take N and y as given.
Regime t’s (flow) payoff to governing is mty - β(N)bt per capita.  β(N)b is the per capita cost
of maintaining political entry barriers in the amount b.  The per capita cost decreases or increases
with population depending on whether there are economies or diseconomies of  scale.
12  When the
first challenger succeeds, the incumbent obviously stops receiving the flow mNy - Nβ(N)b.  If the
first challenger succeeds at date R in the incumbent’s regime, the incumbent’s per capita value of
governing (from the perspective of the time he began) is vt(R):
The probability that regime t lasts exactly R units of time is  , where ht is the ctht e
&cthtR
average success hazard among the challengers and ctht is the aggregate success hazard.  In order to
calculate the expected value of governing as regime t, Vt, we integrate vt(R), weighting by these
probabilities.
In other words, the leadership has a discount rate that combines the usual interest rate r with a
hazard rate ctht for ending the regime.
Challenger i’s expected profit πit from challenging regime t depends on four things: (a) the
hazard of succeeding hit, (b) hazard of the incumbent’s falling ctht, (c) the aggregate value NVt+1 ofPolitical Competitiveness – 8
13We have considered two possible variations on this specification.  One of them also has
a flow cost of challenging (see Lee and Wilde for a private sector patent rate model with both
stock and flow costs of challenging), which makes the numerator (hitNVt+1-bf), where bf is a flow
cost of challenging.
A second variation has the stock entry cost b enabling a challenger to challenge for a
finite period T.  These version has the same qualitative implications as our present model (it
modifies only the profit function by changing the functional form by which r+ch enters), so for
simplicity we do not present them.
14A couple of equilibrium concepts have been considered in the patent race literature. 
One of them is a Nash equilibrium concept in which incumbents choose their markup rate m
taking the number of challengers c as given.  This concept might be realistic in some private
sector applications, but in public sector models it is more common to model the government as a
“leader” that accounts for the effects of its policies on it citizens’ behavior.  Thus, we treat c an
endogenous variable.  In the public sector application, it may even be realistic to treat b as an











beginning the next regime, and (d) the entry barrier bt.  Algebraically, we have
We model b as a one-time cost for a challenger, which gives him a positive success hazard at each
moment in time during which the existing incumbent is still in power.
13  Therefore, the first term in
the expected profit function is an expected present value.
More challengers lower the expected profit from challenging.  Assuming that all challengers
have the same hazard rate, they all have the same zero profit condition, which can be inverted to
calculate the number of challengers.  The incumbent knows this,
14 so it is useful to substitute the
zero profit condition into the incumbent’s value:
The negative effect of ht on incumbent’s value shows why popular support can be valuable to the
incumbent.  Holding constant the hazard per challenger and the incumbent’s net income flow,
incumbent value increases with entry barriers, and declines with successor value, because thesePolitical Competitiveness – 9
discourage and encourage challenges, respectively.
The zero profit condition also illustrates how the number of challengers can be a misleading
measure of the degree of competitiveness.  For example, an incumbent may face zero challengers,
but may have to make sacrifices to maintain that situation.  In particular, the zero profit condition
hitNVt+1 = rbt would constrain the incumbent, who may limit markup m and choose socially optimal
economic and social policies x – as if he did face challengers – in order to ensure that no potential
challengers find a challenge to be profitable (i.e., to ensure that hit remains low enough).  This result
is familiar from the private sector literature (e.g., Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982, and Sutton,
1991 on contestable markets), where it has been noted that tough price competition discourages
entry.
II.B.  Implications of the Zero Profit Condition: The Fundamental Conflict between Challengers and
Incumbent
Some of the patent race model’s implications come from the zero profit condition, regardless
of whether incumbents and challengers are choosing public policies that maximize their economic
value, so it helps to further explore the condition before formally introducing an equilibrium
concept.  One of those are seen in formula (2) for incumbent value, which has the magnitude b of
the entry barrier in the formula multiplicatively because, given the value of one leading the next
regime, it increases the number of challengers and thereby a proportional effect on the actuarial
value of receiving any given income flow while the incumbent regime is in place.  Of course, entry
barriers may enhance the incumbent’s present value, but the proportionality shown in the formula
(2) suggests that value would be enhanced mainly by lengthening the regime rather than increasing
its net income flow.
The zero profit condition creates a fundamental conflict between the incumbent and the
challengers. Equation (2) implies that Vt is inversely proportional to the continuation value Vt+1.
Because a higher Vt+1 encourages entry and hence reduces the expected tenure of the incumbent's
leadership, the incumbent wants this continuation value to be as small as possible. Regime t and t+1
therefore have exactly the opposite opinions about the choice of policies at t+1. In terms of entry
barriers, regime t+1 takes into account the tradeoff between the costs of maintaining the barriers b
and benefit in terms of fewer challengers. Regime t would like bt+1 as far as possible from achieving
this optimal tradeoff, so that Vt+1 is small and nobody has an incentive to challenge it. Similarly,Political Competitiveness – 10
15In principle, either bt+1 very high or bt+1 very low could serve the purpose of minimizing
Vt+1.  However, regime t may prefer bt+1 very low because, due to the enforcement costs, his
successor would have an easier time decreasing bt+1 than increasing it, and regime t’s citizens
might give it credit for starting a transition to democracy. 
NV ' bNmy& β(N)b
h





regime t would like mt+1 to be low enough to discourage any entry.  A dictator therefore does not
want to see his country forever oppressed.
15  Without any means of commitment, the incumbent is
unhappy with the future of excessive oppression because they limit his profit, but is powerless to
do anything.  Perhaps democratic “institutions” build some durability into the system, so that the
incumbent's long term plans for freedom in his country constrain (to some degree) the oppression
of his successors.  Chile provided a historical example of this behavior when its General Pinochet
announced in 1981 that (fair) elections would be held in 1989. Our model suggests that the short
term effect of an announcement like this is to limit political competition, because someone
attempting an overthrow in, say, 1985 would either have to convince the people to scrap fair election
plans, or give up his monopoly after only four years.
The conflict between incumbent and challengers also implies that the effects of permanent
determinants of leadership value of leading are blunted through their impact on challengers.  If, for
example, something reduced the leadership’s net income flow by 50%, it would reduce the
incumbent’s present value by less than 50% because it would discourage challengers.  The more
challengers are discouraged, the less the present value of leading is harmed, but the less value is
harmed, the less challengers are discouraged.  In a stationary equilibrium (namely, an equilibrium
with constant population N, entry barriers b, markup rates m, expected value NV, and expected
lifetime 1/(ch)) the net result of this mutual feedback process is a square root relationship between
the present value of leading and the net income flow from leading.  In this case, both incumbent and
successor value are the same and equation (2) becomes a formula for their squared value:Political Competitiveness – 11
Stationarity and the zero profit condition (equations (3)) help to illustrate our predictions
about the size of nations (Section IV) and the Lipset hypothesis (Section V).  We discuss these
implications of our model in more detail after developing the implications of maximizing behavior.
II.C.  Demand Side Determinants of Political Survival I: Popular Support
In order to derive further results, we must consider the incentives for public policy choices,
which are related to the form of the hazard function h.  In the spirit of Machiavelli (1515, Chapter
XIX), we suppose that a leader’s decisions are influenced by “popular support,” even if he is a
dictator.  We model a leader’s popular support per capita S as a multiplicatively separable function
of utility flow citizens enjoy under his regime:
S  = uy((1-m)y)uf(f)ux(x,Θ) (5)
where uy increases in the relevant range and is concave.  ux has a unique maximum with respect to
x.  ux depends on Θ, a vector of fixed demographic and economic characteristics, including
inequality, determinants of development, and tastes for redistribution.
f measures freedom, which we relate below to the entry barriers b.  We assume that freedom
enhances support over some range.  Note that support (5) is defined in absolute terms.  Obviously
support matters as it compares to a challenger’s support, but the point of our analysis is that the
identity, strategy, and public perception of the challenger are endogenous.  For example, f might
decrease a leader’s support (votes, let’s say) relative to his challenger’s by strengthening the
challenger, but ufN refers to the effect of f on the leader’s support holding fixed the identity, strategy,
and public perception of his challenger.  The shape of uf(f) is not relevant for many of our results
because they hold f fixed.  Otherwise, we admit that f may decrease uf over some range, in which
case both leaders and citizens agree that more oppression is better.  Perhaps this occurs when
citizens desire for their own comfort to suppress certain speech, or exclude a particular minority.
But the interesting case has ufN > 0, at least when f gets small enough, because citizens dislike
censorship, torture, murder, etc.
It is debated (eg., Jackman, 1986; Wittman, 1995; Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin, 2004)
whether ux(@) is simply economic efficiency, or whether ux(@) embodies some important political
failures as determined by electoral rules, checks and balances, administrative procedures, etc.  ThePolitical Competitiveness – 12
16For example, the policy in question may be the rate of income taxation, and ux(@) could
be interpreted as the median voter’s indirect utility of taxation (Meltzer and Richard, 1981), an
indirect social welfare function (Mirrlees, 1971), or a welfare function with weights determined
by electoral rules (Persson and Tabellini, 2003).
17The deadweight costs of taxation provide one example of nonseparability.  Becker and
Mulligan (2003) show that deadweight costs should be expected to diminish public spending,
regardless of whether spending is determined by voting, efficiency, utilitarianism, etc.  Since a
dictatorship would be collecting more m than a democracy, the dictatorship would have a higher
deadweight cost for the first dollar of spending on programs for the public (these are elements of
the x vector), and thereby spend less on them.  However, given that the most oppressive regimes’
public choice and public finance fields have progressed far in terms of specifying the nature of
support needed for political success and the effects of public policies x on that support: some of
these results can be interpreted as specifying the persons or persons whose utility function
determines political support.
16  Our approach complements this previous literature by taking ux(@)
as given, and placing few restrictions on its shape.
Two of our results, namely that political competitiveness does not affect x and political
freedom is a normal good, are affected by the multiplicative separability of the support function (5).
On the second result, political freedom could be a normal good even without separability between
f and y.  We view the separability of x as a good approximation, for a couple of reasons.  According
to one interpretation analogous to private sector behavior, x is the public sector’s “quality” or
“product design” which is separable in citizen’s indirect utility functions from the price (the uy term),
so a dictator should offer the same public sector product design even though he extracts more
revenue from citizens.  Furthermore, f separability might be said to rule out an effect of product
quality on entry barriers.  This may be a strong assumption when studying the private sector, where
a producer discouraging entry is usually limited to indirect means like adjusting his quality, input
mix, etc. (see Mussa and Rosen 1978 for some examples), but in the public sector challengers can
be blocked by more direct and forceful means like execution, torture, and censorship. Second, we
have in mind the empirical results of Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin (2004) which show that the
most oppressive regimes only collect slightly more tax revenue (3% of GDP) than the most
democratic regimes (controlling for development and demographics), so that the various effects on
(1-m)y and the amount of inequality are of limited quantitative significance.  In this case, the effects
on x through (1-m)y and the amount of inequality would be small, even without separability.
17Political Competitiveness – 13
m exceeds the least oppressive regimes’ m by 3% of GDP, our Appendix suggests that, because
of deadweight costs, the former regimes would cut (relative to the latter regimes) their spending
for the general public by only 1 or 2 percent of GDP (= 4 or 5 percent of public spending).
18Interestingly, most of the qualitative comparative statics are unaffected.
Third, to the extent that complementarity is the “realistic” nonseparability for some policy
instruments, we include those instruments in the category of “entry barriers” rather than “social and
economic policies.”
Challenger i’s success hazard hit depends on his relative support:
hit  =  Sit+1/St  =  suy((1-mi,t+1)y)uf(fi,t+1)ux(xi,t+1,Θ)/[uy((1-mt)y)uf(ft)ux(xt,Θ)] (6)
where s is the success hazard (presumably low) of a challenger who is expected to replicate the
incumbent’s policies.  Because we assume that all challengers are identical, henceforth we suppress
the i subscript.
Public policies are determined by the leadership, but when?  One possible assumption is that
a regime committed to public policies during the time when it was challenging the previous regime,
in order to build the popular support required for a takeover.  It is easier, and perhaps more realistic,
to assume that regimes choose public policies only after taking power.
18  Citizens, the previous
regime, etc., may anticipate the new regime’s decisions, but those decisions treat sunk costs as sunk.
Formally, this means that bt and mt have no effect on Vt+1 because those variables are no longer
relevant once the (t+1)st takes power.  It also means that regime (t+1)’s policy does not depend on
which of the challengers succeeded in overthrowing the previous regime.  Formally, an equilibrium
is an infinite sequence {bt,mt,ht,ct,xt,Vt}0
4 of entry barriers, markup rates, number of challengers,
success hazed per challenger, and leadership expected value per capita such that:Political Competitiveness – 14
19Olson (1993), Olson and McGuire (1996), and Niskanen (1997).  Based on an absence
of competition, Wittman (p. 2) conjectures that nondemocratic regimes would be less efficient.
Vt ' max






& bt ' 0
ht ' su f(1&bt%1/y) uy((1 & mt%1)y) ux(xt%1)/[uf(1 & bt/y) uy((1 & mt)y) ux(xt)]
(7)
for all t $ 0, with regime t taking as given the sequence {bs,ms,hs,cs,xs,Vs} from regimes s = t+1 and
forward.
II.D.  Political Competitiveness Does not Affect Economic and Social Policies
Social and economic policies x, like social security, the minimum wage, various rates of
taxation, etc., are functionally unrelated to the blocking of political challengers.  These policies do
affect the government’s popular support and thereby its survival as modeled by equation (6).  Hence
all regimes will choose the same x, conditional on demographics, because each is choosing x to
maximize ux.
Proposition 1 (Invariance)  All regimes choose their economic and social policies x as the same
function of economic and demographic characteristics Θ.
Proposition 1 derives from the assumptions that regimes maximize their value and that x affects that
value only through a separable popular support function, although the separability does not have to
be multiplicative as we have shown here.  Obviously, without separability the effect of b on an
element of x could be either positive or negative or zero depending on the sign of the various second
derivatives of S.
Olson, McGuire, and Niskanen pioneered formal analysis of the degree of competition for
public office.
19  Their models predict that dictators are leviathans, extracting the maximum possiblePolitical Competitiveness – 15
20Brennan and Buchanan (1980) have a model in which even democracies are leviathans,
except as limited by their constitutions.
21See also Grossman (1991).
22Our model has apparent similarities with Olson’s (1991) “roving bandit” model, except
that we treat the degree of roving as endogenous.  Namely, leaders in our model use popular
support as one means to remain longer in office.  Olson (1991) also emphasizes policy horizons;
our Appendix II derives some results for policy horizons in our model, and compares them with
Olson’s.
tax revenue from their countries, and consuming the proceeds themselves (except perhaps for
expenditures to enhance the tax base).
20  In other words, in their view my is quite large, and x quite
different, under dictatorship because the dictators uses all policy instruments to maximize my subject
to the Laffer curve.  Obviously they disagree with our Proposition 1, and the reason is already
familiar to students of industrial organization.  Olson et al. model dictators as monopolists limited
only by the Laffer curve, whereas we assume that a dictator (or any other government leader) is
mainly limited by the threat of entry.
21  They implicitly reject (or assume that dictators reject)
Machiavelli, because their dictators have no concern for popular support.  For Olson et al., profits
per capita are my/r in present value for dictators (r is the interest rate) and zero for democratic
leaders.  In contrast, our model features “monopolistic competition,” with all leaders expecting
profits less than the Olson et al dictators, both because they receive a smaller profit flow and
discount it for fewer years.  We postulate a reduced profit flow because we anticipate that leaders
will limit their income in order to maintain some popularity and thereby lengthen their regimes
expected lifetime.  They also dissipate some of their income by erecting and maintaining entry
barriers.  Leaders in our model discount cash flows at more than r, because there is always the
chance that the regime is ended.
22
Later we show that the entry barrier b might be high enough that there are no challengers and
the incumbent’s regime lasts forever.  Nonetheless, Proposition 1 obtains because, by choosing the
best public policy vector x, a leader lowers the value of challenging and thereby lowers the entry
barrier required to make challenging unprofitable (remember that entry barriers are costly to
maintain).  Thus we have a public sector analogue to the contestable market hypothesis: a market
may have only one producer but nonetheless perform much like a competitive market.  A dictator
can have public policies much like a democracy’s, even though he has no visible challengers.Political Competitiveness – 16
23Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) predicts that changes in political institutions will have
no effect on economic institutions, because leaders can invest more in their de facto power in
democracy than in nondemocracy.  Acemoglu and Robinson obtain this result by modeling the
conflict between leaders and citizens, whereas we model the competition between incumbent
leader and other potential leaders.  Interestingly, in a sample of 89 heads of authoritarian
government that held office for at least one year and lost power by irregular means between 1950
and 1990, Svolik (2006) finds that only 6 lost power from because of popular uprising, while the
remaining were removed by other political competitors.
24See also Easterly and Rebelo (1993, p. 436), Lindert (1994), and Mulligan, Gil, and
Sala-i-Martin (2002) , who found no cross-country relationship between democracy and a
number of government tax and expenditure items. 
If Proposition 1 were right, there should be no partial correlation over time or across
countries between democracy (measured in terms of political competitiveness) and various measures
of economic and social policies.  Olson, McGuire, Niskanen, Acemoglu, Robinson, Boix (2003),
and several others disagree, arguing that democracy should affect the mapping ux(@) from public
policy into popular support, and, for example, deriving that “democratic regimes generally choose
policies that are more favorable to the poor than nondemocratic regimes” (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2003, p. 3).
23  On the other hand, empirical studies in sociology, economics, and political science
have found little impact of democracy on public policies that probably do not serve as political entry
barriers.  For example, Cutright (1965), Jackman (1975), and Pampel and Williamson (1989)
observed an obvious raw correlation between democracy and the introduction of pension and welfare
programs, but pointed out that economic development likely drives social programs, and is
correlated with democracy.  Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin’s (2004) cross-country study for the
years 1960-90 finds no significant partial correlation between democracy and the amount of welfare
spending, education spending, the corporate income tax rate, and whether the payroll tax is capped.
24
They admit that democracies are different in terms of torture, execution, military policies, etc., but
our Proposition 1 does not apply because these policies are closely linked with barriers to political
entry.
II.E.  The Distribution of Income
Studies of the supply side of private sector industries usually distinguish between a “short
run” when prices equilibrate the market and entry and/or capital are held constant, and a “long run”Political Competitiveness – 17
25Perhaps political institutions do have costs of adjustment, although see Acemoglu and
and Robinson (2006) for historical examples of rapidly adjusting political institutions.  
26Analytically similar results can be found in the probabilistic voting literature (e.g.,
Coughlin et al., 1990).
27For simplicity, this condition is based on the assumption that per capita income is
independent of the markup rate.  Even if per capita income were a function y(m) of the markup
rate, the leadership would still maximize the product (mty(m)-βbt)uy((1-mt)y(m)) of the flows to
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when all variables are endogenous.  Sometimes the distinction is quite literal in that entry and capital
accumulation are spread over time due to explicit costs of adjustment, and other times the distinction
is more intellectual than literal.  We maintain the same tradition in our analysis, by first considering
the case in which political entry barriers b are a given fraction of per capita income y, and later
taking b as endogenous.
25
With b given, the incumbent’s optimal markup rate solves:
A high markup brings the incumbent a larger revenue flow, but makes him unpopular thereby
shortening his regime’s lifetime.  A low markup is popular and would enhance survival, but the
revenue flow while in office would be small.
The product (mty-βbt)uy((1-mt)y), which we obtain by substituting the endogenous
determinants of h into the endogenous component of formula above for the value of governing,
might be interpreted as a social welfare function of the per capita flows of net income to leadership
and citizens.  Of course, the citizens’ weight in this function is not determined by ethical
considerations, but rather by the effect of their welfare on the regimes survival via support.
26  The
optimal markup rate is described by the first order condition
27Political Competitiveness – 18
28See Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) for some empirical findings along these
lines.
f ' 1 & b/y (9)
On the left hand side is the per capita flow of net income to the leadership.  On the right is a function
of the citizens’ per capita income.  Thus, the formula (8) describes the distribution of net income
between citizens and leadership.
Notice that b appears in the income distribution condition only through the per capita cost
βb of maintaining entry barriers because the costs and benefits of m are both flows.  Thus, holding
βb constant, larger entry barriers serve entirely to prolong the regime (see also our discussion in
Section II.B of the implications of the zero profit condition), and not to increase its flow of income.
b does increase βb, which means that b increases the leadership gross income flow but the added
gross flow is dissipated through greater costs of maintaining the barriers.  Thus, while dictatorships
may collect more revenue than democracies, the excess may be small and associated with spending
on the military and other expenditures for blocking competition and increasing survival.
28 
II.F.  Demand Side Determinants of Political Survival II: The Demand For Freedom
So far, we have treated the entry barrier b as a fixed parameter.  The next step is analogous
to the work of Beard (1913), Niskanen (1990), and Aghion et al. (2004), who use the political effects
of constitutional rules to form a positive theory of constitutions, except that our attention is limited
to political entry barriers as measured by a scalar b.
Although political entry barriers are an important source of political rents, the leadership may
rationally limit entry barriers in order to gain popular support and to economize on the costs of
oppression.  Entry barriers can hurt support in two ways.  First, and least significant, is the fact that
the entry barriers are a resource cost for the challengers, some of whom may be among the citizens.
However, we neglect this effect because there are only c/N challengers per capita, and c/N is likely
small (and can even be zero in equilibrium).  Second, political entry barriers may limit the
enjoyment of freedom by the citizens.  We account for this effect with a production function for
freedom:Political Competitiveness – 19
29Section V discusses in more detail the relation between freedom and per capita income,













[y(1&ft)(y & zt& β(N)y(1&ft))][uf(ft) uy(zt)]
Notice that freedom declines with b/y or, equivalently, that the entry costs faced by challengers as
a consequence of limited freedom increase with per capita income.  Examples of this type include
the death penalty or political incarceration, because victim’s economic costs of his death or each day
in prison are proportional to his opportunity costs, such as his value of time.
29
In order to calculate regime t’s preferred entry barrier bt, we begin with the definition of
equilibrium (7), substitute the zero profit condition into the incumbent’s value formula, and factor
out some of the variables exogenous to the incumbent:
Raising bt has one marginal benefit and two marginal costs.  The marginal benefit is reducing the
number of challengers, which by itself has a proportional effect on incumbent value because
incumbent and challengers discount certain cash flows at the same rate r and are concerned with the
same stochastic event: the end of the incumbent’s regime.  One marginal cost is a loss of popular
support, which makes each challenger more successful.  The other marginal cost is that entry barriers
are costly to maintain.
In order to characterize the regime’s preferred policy in terms of the preferences of the
citizens, we (without loss of generality) restate the problem in terms of the goods in the citizens’
utility function, namely net income z = (1-m)y and freedom f = 1-b/y.  We also factor out variables




A necessary condition for an interior optimum is that the marginal rate of substitution in the first
square bracket term equals the marginal rate of substitution in the citizen’s utility function (the
second square bracket term).  Thus the amount of freedom chosen by the regime is the same that
citizens would choose for themselves if they faced first square bracket term as the constraint
dictating their tradeoff between freedom and net income.  This duality is no surprise, since, taking
as given the number of challengers and its flow of net income, the incumbent regime would like to
make the public as happy as possible because public happiness with the incumbent regime makes
each challenger unlikely to succeed.
The “price” of freedom is the slope of term in square brackets, namely:
Notice that the price of freedom is proportional to GDP per capita.  If we had focused on the demand
side only, we might predict that the demand for freedom increases with GDP per capita as long as
freedom is a normal good.  But this prediction ignores the supply of freedom: GDP per capita raises
the cost to the leadership of supplying freedom.  Freedom as a normal good is necessary, but not
sufficient, for GDP per capita to increase freedom.
The price of freedom falls with the marginal cost β of maintaining and enforcing entry
barriers.  Because the demand side is neutral with respect to β, the supply side predicts that freedom
rises (and b falls) with β.  With fairly weak conditions on the utility function (see Section V for
details), β increases the markup rate m.  As explained below, this comparative static gives us
predictions regarding the effects of population (Section IV), various methods of punishing dictators
(Section III), and enforcement technical change (Section V).
Because leaders strive for popular support, citizen preferences for freedom are one
determinant of the equilibrium amount of freedom, and whether or not they will dominate supply
side determinants.  Hypotheses about the shape of citizen’s preferences for freedom can, in principle,
be empirically estimated by studies of behaviors related to imprisonment (e.g., Abrams and Rohlfs,
2006), uncensored reading materials, draft dodging, etc.  Conducting such studies is beyond the
scope of this paper, so we state results for our model conditional on various hypotheses aboutPolitical Competitiveness – 21
preferences, and give somewhat more weight to those hypotheses we suspect more likely.
III.  Unintended Consequences of Punishing Dictators 
We have built an economic model of regime turnover.  One use of such a model is to help
predict the effects of foreign policies intended to encourage “regime change.”  Here we consider two
such foreign policies: reductions in leadership net income and the repudiation of odious debts.  The
effects of these policies are very different if dictators maximize tax revenue rather than, as in our
model, trade off revenue flows and survival.  Our model does not defend dictatorship because, to
the extent that regime matters, dictatorships are predicted to be somewhat worse in terms of incomes
for citizens and a lot worse in terms of political and personal freedoms.  However, punishing
dictatorial regimes can have adverse consequences for efficiency and freedom if the punishment is
not designed with attention to political competitiveness and entry into the market for political
leadership.
III.A.  Citizens Suffer, and Regimes Likely Prolonged, When The Leadership is Punished
Suppose a country were to suffer a perpetual loss L from its net government revenue, perhaps
because it is subject to economic sanctions, spends on the military to deter invasion (as the USSR
did), etc.  If the government had already been extracting the maximum possible revenue from its
citizens, then there is nothing it could do to shift the burden of L to its citizens.  Leaders in our
model – even those facing no challengers – do not extract the maximum possible revenue from their
citizens in order to enhance regime survival.  They share the economy’s resources with the citizens
according to the income distribution condition (8).  In other words, dm/dL > 0; both citizens and
leadership suffer lost income flows as a consequence of the punishment L.
To the extent that challengers expect to suffer the same loss L if they were to lead the
government, the cost of L to the incumbent is further mitigated.  For example, the equations (3) show
how there is a square root (i.e., less than proportional) relationship between the regime’s net income
flow and its value because the number of challengers depends on the net income flow expected byPolitical Competitiveness – 22
30A similar result is familiar from the private sector literature (e.g., Sutton, 1991, and
predecessors), where it has been noted that tough price competition discourages entry.
An alternate way of punishing dictators is to have a country suffer a perpetual loss L
directly from per capita income y. This may be the case if in practice it is difficult to target
punishment on government revenue.  Citizens lose income, a loss that is further exacerbated by
the responses of dictators in the form of raising m.  Moreover, as we show in Section V, freedom
1-b/y is likely to decrease when income decreases.
31Wintrobe (2006, pp. 70-1) recommends that foreign policy be conditioned on
“repression” or “human rights.”
successors.
30  Thus, if L were intended to help citizens by hastening the demise of the regime, it
serves neither purpose: the regime lasts longer and reduces citizens’ net incomes.
Punishments are more effective, in terms of enhancing freedom and raising citizen utility,
when conditioned on entry barriers.
31  For example, if L were known by the leadership to be
proportional to b, the effects of the punishment are isomorphic to the effects of increasing the
parameter β.  As explained in Section II, β increases the markup rate m and decreases entry barriers
b because β makes it cheaper for the leadership to supply freedom.  By itself, less b increases the
number of challengers.  On the other hand, challengers are discouraged by the lower net income they
anticipate.  Citizens also enjoy more consumption (1-m)y than they would under an unconditional
punishment of the same magnitude because the markup rate m depends on the sum L + βb (see the
income distribution condition (8), modified to include L), and not its composition.
Some of these unintended consequences occur because challengers anticipate a lesser value
from leading.  It follows that punishing a dictator hastens his demise if it is known that his successor
will not be punished, regardless of his policies.  Perhaps this helps explain why Germany’s
unpopular Weimar republic (unpopular for reasons including the Versailles Treaty and the Great
Depression) made fertile political ground for Hitler’s regime.  However, this approach still reduces
citizens’ incomes and, as the German example shows, gives no incentive for the successor regime
to be less oppressive.  Lessons like these are familiar in industrial organization, where supply
conditions are given a lot of attention and it is widely recognized that, say, a tax on producers may
hurt competitiveness and consumers more than it hurts producers.
III.B.  Repudiating Odious Debt Makes Regimes More Oppressive
Odious debt – sovereign borrowing for the benefit of the dictator and not the people – mayPolitical Competitiveness – 23
32Legitimate economic development loans are part of the x vector, which we hold fixed. 
One Ricardian possibility (see Barro, 1974) is that the dictator can borrow from his citizens by
tilting the time profile for m, and then his citizens could borrow from abroad.  In this case, which
we rule out for the sake of argument, odious debt repudiation has no effect on the welfare of
dictator or citizens.
33Odious debt can also be modeled as an increase in the incumbent’s tax base at the
expense of his successor’s tax base.  However, the effect of tax base on leadership income is
ambiguous (see Proposition 3) because, in our model, the entry barrier rather than the tax base is
the primary determinant of leadership income.
34More precisely, incumbent value is proportional to (r+ch)
-1, which declines with ch but
declines less when r is large.  In other words, the benefit to reducing the success of challengers
declines with r.
offer another example.  It has been proposed (most recently by Kremer and Jayachandran, 2006) that
odious debts be repudiated as a way of hurting dictators and helping their citizens.  Studying all
aspects of odious debt repudiation – for example, how to detect odious debt, and to ensure that all
countries can obtain legitimate economic development loans, etc., – is beyond the scope of this
paper, but an economic analysis of odious debt would benefit from attention to political
competitiveness.  Suppose, for the sake of argument, that odious debt were known to be accurately
identified and repudiated, so that a market for it would not exist and it would never be issued.  In
the context of our model, this means that the dictator cannot borrow to smooth his cash flows.
32
Hence r becomes the dictator’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, rather than the world
interest rate, and we presume the former is larger (otherwise he would have no desire to borrow).
In short, the odious debt market collapse can be modeled as an increase in r.
33
Even though the value of leadership involves future cash flows, the formula (2) for
incumbent present value does not depend on the discount rate r because r has an exactly offsetting
effect on the forward-looking challengers.  Thus, higher r has no impact on m and b.  A regime’s
expected tenure increases with r because the number of challengers decreases.  Thus, if odious debt
repudiation effects incumbent and successor equally, it has the unintended effect of lengthening the
incumbent’s tenure, while having no impact on entry barriers or citizens’ incomes.
Intuitively, the incumbent’s benefits from b are in the more distant future than are the
benefits from m because b serves to lengthen the regime.
34  If odious debt repudiation affected only
the incumbent’s discount rate, then the incumbent would raise his markup rate because the higherPolitical Competitiveness – 24
discount rate makes him less future-oriented.  To the extent that entry barriers can adjust, the same
reasoning implies that odious debt repudiation can decrease the entry barriers bt protecting the
incumbent regime.  However, this version of odious debt repudiation still gives no incentive to the
successor regime to limit its entry barriers bt+1, and leaves citizens with less net income.  The fact
that the value of governing is limited by competition, and not good will, means that dictators can
pass on their punishments, at least in part, to citizens and competitors.  In summary, we have the
Proposition 2.  (Economic Incidence of Punishing Dictators) (a) The burden of punishing dictators
is shared among dictators and citizens, even if the punishment is targeting the former, although to
a lesser degree when the punishment is conditional on entry barriers.  (b) Repudiating odious debt
increases the expected tenure of incumbent dictators if odious debt repudiation affects both
incumbent and successors equally. If it only affects incumbent, it tends to increase the markup rate
and lower entry barriers.
IV.  The Extent of the Political Market: Three Margins of Adjustment
The effect of population N on markup rates and competition has implications for
international conflict and the size of nations.  All else the same, it is better to rule a large jurisdiction
than a small one.  It follows from the zero profit condition that all else cannot be the same:
population either reduces the per capita flow of net income to the leadership, reduces the regime’s
expected duration by increasing the number of challengers, or increases entry barriers, or some
combination of all three.  If population either reduces the net income flow per capita or increases
the number of challengers, then the value of leadership per capita falls with population even though
the aggregate value of leadership rises.
IV.A.  The Size of Nations and the Democratic Peace
Because the value of leadership increases with population, leaders have an incentive to
acquire territory and encourage population growth, especially when they are nondemocratic.
Perhaps this is why Alesina and Spolare observe a positive effect of democracy on nation splitting:
a democratic leader (who, by definition, earns little rent) has less to lose from reductions in the
population he leads.Political Competitiveness – 25
Przeworski et al. (2000) find that regime type affects the rate of population growth. In
particular, they provide evidence that population grows faster under dictatorships than under
democracies because birth rates are higher under the former.  They attribute the higher fertility under
nondemocracies to more policy uncertainty which leads parents to hoard children as a form of less
risky asset. We, however, argue that the phenomenon may be explained by the interaction between
barriers to entry and population; namely, the marginal benefit of N increases with b.  Interestingly,
Mirilovic (2006) argues that there is more immigration into rich dictatorships than into rich
democracies, because dictatorships adopt more permissive immigration policies. 
The same logic implies in reverse, namely that democratic countries are more likely to
subdivide than are nondemocratic ones.  Hence we predict that country unions are more likely to
spread nondemocracy to larger groups of people, as under Hitler and the USSR, whereas country
divisions are important for the creation of democratic governments.
If population reduces the markup rate (this occurs under conditions specified below), then
there are further implications for the size of nations because the citizens themselves would prefer
to live in a large nondemocracy than a small one.  Although nothing may be “good” about
oppression, in this case the markups paid to nondemocratic leaders are analytically similar to the
“public goods” featured in the economics of country size (e.g., Alesina and Spolare 2003) because
the per capita cost of both public goods and paying a dictator falls with population.  Perhaps this is
why Alesina and Spolare find an effect of democracy on nation splitting, and why they confirm a
number of implications of the public good model without having many literal examples of public
goods.
The interaction between democracy and the effects of population also have implications for
the incidence of country mergers, and thereby the types of countries that might fight with each other
over people and territory.  First of all, the incidence of merging two countries depends on whether
the two countries are both democratic, both nondemocratic, or one of each.  Second, it matters
whether the newly merged country would be ruled as democratic or not.  For example, two
democracies have little to gain by merging, because their markup rates are already low (by
definition).  Citizens of democracies stand to lose if they merge with a nondemocratic country.  The
citizens of a nondemocracy have more to gain by merging with another country, especially if the
new country were to be ruled democratically.  The proposition that nondemocratic citizens have
something to gain from their country’s losing a war helps explain why citizens of democracies arePolitical Competitiveness – 26
35See Elman (1997) for a survey.
36For a proof of this proposition, notice that N has no effect on the marginal rates of
substitution in the leadership’s value function (10).
observed to fight more effectively (Reiter and Stam, 1998).  Perhaps the German experience at the
end of WWII shows that citizens do seriously consider the degree of political competitiveness that
will prevail after a war, and that they are better off losing to the democracy.  For example, German
refugees almost always chose to migrate westward toward the advancing U.S. and British armies
than migrating eastward toward Soviet armies.  The Germans also put up more resistence on their
eastern front.
Because citizens of democracies have less to gain when their country acquires persons and
territory, democratic countries might be more peaceful, and less likely to merge.  This does not by
itself imply that democracies would fight fewer wars, because democracies may be targets of
nondemocracies, or because the citizens of democracies are economically or altruistically linked to
the citizens of nondemocracies, but it does imply that democracies would fight less with other
democracies.  Interestingly, the international conflict literature
35 finds that democracies fight less
with democracies, an empirical finding which is known as the (dyadic version of) “democratic
peace.” The democratic peace literature interprets this behavior in terms of democratic morals, or
the incapacity of democratic leaders to make important decisions, but our model suggests that a
democratic peace might be observed even in the absence of these factors, merely because of the
economics of competitiveness.
IV.B.  Constant versus Increasing Returns to Scale in Oppression
Whether, and how much, population affects each of the three margins – the per capita flow
of net income to the leadership, the number of challengers, and the magnitude of entry barriers –
depends in part on the nature of the enforcement technology β(N) and whether the number of
challengers is strictly positive.  If the enforcement of entry barriers has constant returns to scale (i.e.,
β is independent of N), then population effects only the number of challengers and not the markup
rate m or per-challenger entry barrier b.
36  With the flow of income to the leadership and the per-
challenger entry barrier independent of population, the zero profit condition is maintained by a
combination of more challengers and shorter durations for the leadership.  The square root formulaPolitical Competitiveness – 27
37If we consider the “barriers to exit” interpretation of b, one example of scale economies
comes from Friedman (1977), namely that large countries have fewer miles of boarder to patrol
per capita.  With scale economies, a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for dm/dN < 0 is that
income elasticity of citizens’ freedom demand exceeds the price elasticity in magnitude (the
elasticities are defined precisely below).
38Acemoglu and Linn (2004) and Cerda (2003) study this phenomenon in the
pharmaceutical industry.  See also Breshnahan and Reiss (1991) for an empirical study of the
relation between entry, pricing, and market size for selected private industries. 
(3) shows how the stationary equilibrium number of challengers and aggregate value of leadership
increase with the square root of population, at least over the range of parameters for which the
number of challengers is strictly positive.
If the number of challengers were zero, the regime’s (infinite) horizon would not be affected
by small changes in population.  Instead, population would decrease the net flow of leadership
income per capita via some combination of the added cost of the entry barriers required to deter
challengers and a reduced markup rate.  Enforcement scale economies (i.e., βN(N) < 0) may be
another reason why population reduces the markup rate.
37  In summary, we have
Proposition 3. (The Extent of the Political Market) The value of leadership and number of
challengers increase with the extent of the political market.  Moreover, dictators have greater
incentives to acquire territory and encourage population growth than do democratic leaders. When
enforcement of entry barriers has increasing returns, entry barriers increase, and markup rates
decrease, with population.
IV.C.  Application: Contested Elections Across U.S. Offices
As explained above, our model predicts that population increases the number of challengers
and the rate of turnover.  This comparative static is analytically familiar from the private sector
patent race literature, in which a larger prize for an invention encourages people to attempt to search
for that invention.
38  In the political sector, it means that more candidates challenge the incumbent
when the aggregate markup is large.  When the competition occurs via elections, it follows that the
number of challengers and the probability of a challenger’s victory in the election increases with the
jurisdiction size N and other proxies for the extent of the political market.Political Competitiveness – 28
39In the earlier period, 2-year gubernatorial terms were more common (in which case the
extent of the Senate market might be considered greater).  The number of elections used to
compile Table 1 is less than the number actually held due to observations missing from the
computer file.
Coats & Dalton (1992) study of British parliamentary general elections 1852-80 finds the
size of jurisdiction is the best predictor of whether an election of would be contested.  This pattern
is conspicuous in U.S. elections too.  Table 1 combines our calculations from ICPSR study #0002
with those of Mulligan and Hunter (2003).  The rows of the Table are ordered by our judgement of
the extent of the political market.  Since essentially all of the United States had elections of the five
types listed in the table, the number of elections measured (reported in the left half of the Table)
helps inform this judgement because we presume that the extent of the political market is larger
when the U.S. is divided into fewer jurisdictions or the elections occur less frequently.  For example,
although the jurisdictions covered by each of the first three rows are the entire state, we presume that
the extent of the market is smallest for U.S. Senate elections because they occur every three years
(on average) whereas Presidential and Gubernatorial elections typically occur on a four year cycle.
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U.S. House districts are smaller, and the elections more frequent, than U.S. Senate elections so we
presume that the latter have a larger political market.  Jurisdictions are smaller still for state House
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40We do not have data for the earlier period.
41All challengers are the same in our model, but in reality some challengers are more
serious threats to the incumbent than others.  We have examined the same elections (except
Presidential) shown in Table 1, and find that, during both time periods, victory margins are
smaller for offices with a greater political market.
The same data suggest offices associated with larger political markets turn over more
often.  During both time periods, party turnover from one election to the next was much higher
for Governors and U.S. Senators than for U.S. Representives and for State Senators and State
Representatives.
Table 1: Frequency of Uncontested Elections by Year and Office
number of elections percentage uncontested
office 1911-67 1968-89 1911-67 1968-89
President (state level ballot) 661 294 0 0
Governor 621 288 2.4 0
U.S. Senator 581 359 4.0 0.6
U.S. Representative 11,668 4591 9.2 4.1
State Senator or Representative NA 51,262 NA 21.9
Sources: (1) State Senator and Representative from Mulligan and Hunter (2003)
(2)  Other offices calculated from ICPSR study #0002, for general elections in the 50 states
minus Louisiana (in which some general elections are automatically uncontested because a
candidate obtains a majority in an open primary)
Table 1’s first row shows that at least two presidential candidates were on the ballot in every
state – i.e., none of them were uncontested.  The second and third rows show that a few
gubernatorial and U.S. Senate elections were uncontested.  The fourth row shows that elections to
the U.S. House of Representatives were unopposed 9.2% of the time during the earlier period, and
4.1% of the time during the later period.  The last row on the right half shows that almost 22% of
elections to state Senates and state Houses of Representatives are uncontested during the later
period.
40  In summary, during both time periods, offices with larger political markets are more likely
to be contested.
41  Comparing the earlier and later periods shows that uncontested elections are less
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V.  Democratization
Economic outcomes represented by various parameters in our model – such as military
technologies, communication technologies, standards of living, etc., – have changed significantly
over time, and thereby provide the basis for a theory of democratization.  In this section we give
attention to the effects of the parameter β (the marginal cost of maintaining and enforcing entry
barriers) and the parameter y (per capita income).
V.A.  Enforcement Technical Change
The parameter β is the marginal enforcement cost of deterring entry.  As discussed above,
this may be related to the size of the jurisdiction.  But it may also depend on the technologies
available for communication, monitoring and pursuing criminals, etc.  The entry process is a conflict
between challengers and incumbent, so in principle technological advancement can either raise or
lower β.  George Orwell’s famous 1984 raised the possibility that technological progress would
favor the government leadership.  Our model predicts that entry barriers b fall, enforcement
expenditures βb rise, and markup rates m rise, with β.  If George Orwell were right, then (by
reducing β) technical progress would reduce freedom and reduce enforcement expenditures, but
increase citizens’ net incomes.
Communication technologies are often thought to favor challengers to the government, as
with the famous moon cakes in China with which rebels coordinated efforts by baking messages
inside cakes.  More recently, the proliferation of the internet has helped challengers to the
government to coordinate with each other, because they no longer have to rely on physical meetings
or distribution of hard-copies of their communications.  By raising β, the internet should increase
freedom, but not as much as it would have if government policy were held constant, because
government increases their enforcement expenditures in response to the technical change.  Examples
include attempts by governments to censor the internet or limit its distribution within their borders.
V.B.  The Lipset Hypothesis, Natural Resource Curse, and other Effects of Economic Development
Our model has predictions related to the well-known “Lipset (1959) hypothesis,” namely that
economic development increases the likelihood that a polity is democratic.  GDP per capita yPolitical Competitiveness – 31
42It may also enter the Θ vector appearing the x portion of the utility function; this
possibility has no effect on our results.
43A price elasticity of freedom demand that is smaller than the income elasticity (these
terms are precisely defined below), is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for dm/dy < 0.






appears in four places in our model.
42  First, on the supply side, it increases the benefit of
challenging holding the markup rate m constant.  Second, also on the supply side, it increases the
flow of net income to the incumbent.  Third, on the demand side, it increases the flow of net income
to citizens.  Fourth, gdp per capita appears in the freedom production function.  Freedom declines
with b/y or, equivalently, that the entry costs faced by challengers as a consequence of limited
freedom increase with per capita income.  In this fourth instance, and only in this instance, GDP per
capita appears in the model as a proxy for citizens’ opportunity costs of challenging.  Thus, if
economic development means proportional increases in both opportunity costs (especially the value
of time) and GDP per capita, then the applicable comparative static in our model varies y in all four
places.  If the opportunity cost of challenging is held constant (as it might be if economic
development derived from increases in nonhuman wealth, such as an oil discovery), then the
applicable comparative static in our model varies y only on the first three places.
Comparative statics that hold freedom f fixed can be examined from the income distribution
condition (8), modified as (8)N only to reflect the freedom production function (whose inverse is b
= (1-f)y.
Only the y multiplying 1-f appears in the income distribution condition because it proxies for the
opportunity cost of challenging.  If this were held constant, then y unambiguously increases both my
and (1-m)y.  Intuitively, extra GDP per capita is shared between the leadership and the citizens.  y
is likely to decrease the markup rate m.
43  If the opportunity cost of challenging also increased with
y, then m either increases or decreases (or stays constant) depending on the shape of the utility
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44In the special case η = 1,  citizens’ utility is homothetic with a constant elasticity of









[f (σ&1)/σ & 1]
(12)
In order to further explore how citizens’ freedom demand affects public policy, we
parameterize the utility function as follows:
where η, σ, and φ are positive constants.  With these functions, the utility function uy(z)uf(f) is a
nonhomothetic version of the CES utility function.  The paremeter φ dictates the relative preference
of freedom versus consumption.  σ is the constant elasticity of substitution between z
η and f, and is
therefore price elasticity of freedom demand when z is held constant.  The magnitude of η dictates
how nonhomothetic is the utility function; η is greater (less) than one as the income elasticity of
freedom demand is greater (less) than one.
44  We therefore refer to η and σ as the “income elasticity”
and the “price elasticity” of freedom demand, respectively.  One important property of the utility
function is whether the ratio of income to price elasticity η/σ (sometimes known as the “coefficient
of income variation, e.g., Hicks and Allen, 1934) is greater than, less than, or equal to one.  In the
latter case, a proportional increase in GDP per capita and the opportunity cos of challenging has no
effect on m with b held fixed.
y affects the supply of freedom.  The leaderships marginal rate of transformation between
freedom and citizen net income is [m/(1-f)-2β]y, of which the m term reflects the effect of GDP on
the leadership’s potential tax base and the β term reflects the effect of the opportunity costs of
challenging on entry costs for given amount of freedom.  If the opportunity costs of challenging
were proportional to GDP per capita, then both terms are proportional to y.  If the opportunity costs
were held constant, then y increases the marginal rate of transformation more than proportionally,
because y increases gross leadership revenue my but does not increase its costs.  Thus, we conclude
that more GDP per capita does less to increase (or more to decrease) freedom when the additional
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45The private sector literature on the “countercyclical markup” (e.g., Rotemberg and
Woodford, 1999) emphasizes the opposite result (dm/dy < 0) derived because entry barriers are
held fixed, which means that an expansion of the market induces monopolistically competitive
producers to price closer to marginal cost (see also Sutton, 1991).  Our model also has dm/dy < 0
with entry barriers held fixed if either βN(N) < 0 or c = 0.  Wintrobe (1990) also derives dm/dy <
0 for the public sector, but for a different reason: in his model y increases support for the
incumbent relative to support for his challengers.
utility functions (12) with price and income elasticities that are equal in magnitude, citizens’
marginal rate of substitution is itself proportional to y which implies that freedom is independent of
y when the opportunity costs of challenging are proportional to GDP per capita, and declines with
y when the opportunity costs of challenging are held constant.
We believe that the income elasticity of citizens’ freedom demand likely exceeds the price
elasticity in magnitude, in which case y increases freedom f, entry barriers b, the markup rate m, and
the number of challengers c when the opportunity costs of challenging are proportional to GDP per
capita.
45  With the opportunity costs of challenging held constant, y increases freedom less, and may
decrease it.  In summary, our approach says that predicting the effect of development on democracy
requires more than an analysis of the demand side.  The supply of freedom is also affected by
development, and as a result freedom need not increase with development (especially when income
gains derive from natural resoruces) even if freedom, civic norms, and the like, were normal goods
(see Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens, 1993).
One of the central empirical findings of the political economy literature is the positive
cross-country correlation between income and democracy. This correlation has led some economists
as well as political scientists to interpret democracy as a normal good. However, this view has been
recently challanged by Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and Acemoglu et al. (2005). Moreover,
Haggard and Kaufman (1995) and Acemoglu et al. (2005) show that economic crisis makes
democracy more likely. On the other hand, Tsui (2006) provides evidence that wealth generated
from oil discovery slows down democratic transition. These findings contradict the modernization
theory, which asserts a causal link between economic development and democracy. They are,
nonetheless, consistent with our theory, which emphasizes the supply side of democracy. Economic
growth (especially that resulting from natural resources) does not necessarily foster democracy –
even if freedom is a normal good.  In summary, we havePolitical Competitiveness – 34
46See Demsetz (1973), Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982), Sutton (1991), and Baldwin
and Gorecki (1994).
Proposition 4. (Lipset Hypothesis)  Economic development decreases the supply of freedom.
Therefore, economic development is more likely to foster democracy to the degree that the income
elasticity of freedom demand exceeds its price elasticity in magnitude and human capital (rather than
natural resources) is the source of development.
VI.  Conclusions
Our paper adapts and extends models of private sector patent races to analyze the causes and
consequences of competitiveness in the public sector. Some of our results are familiar from the
private sector literatures, although sometimes unappreciated in discussions of the public sector.  If
we are right that the economic theory of competitiveness applies to both the private and public
sectors, our approach greatly widens the range of empirical observations than can be used to make
predictions about political behaviors, and widens the ranges of empirical observations that can be
used to make predictions about private industrial behaviors.
One of the familiar private sector results – arguably applicable to political behaviors – is that
competitiveness can be measured in several ways.  In our model, the size b/y of the entry barrier
relative to challenger opportunity cost is one measure, and is conceptually closest to POLITY IV
and other empirical indices constructed by political scientists.  ch, the hazard of the incumbent
losing his job to a challenger, is sometimes taken as an indicator of political competitiveness, for
example, when a country is considered “undemocratic” because the incumbent executive seems to
have too much electoral success relative to challengers.  However, as with the private sector,
measuring competitiveness by ch can be misleading because even an incumbent without challengers
may limit his behavior in order to remain that way.  Just as commentators in the I-O literature
questioned the Justice Department’s pursuit of anti-trust cases based on industry concentration,
46 our
model suggests that regimes with few challengers may nonetheless be quite democratic in the sense
that entry barriers and markup rates are low.  Perhaps constitutions or other political institutions
designed to “police” the amount of political competitiveness better serve the public by monitoring
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appropriate that some of the measures of democracy developed by political scientists are based on
entry barriers rather than the number of competitors.
The “markup” or profit rate m is commonly used to measure noncompetitiveness in private
sector studies, and it would be interesting to examine such measures for the public sector.  However,
recall our finding that comparative statics for the markup rate are smaller when entry barriers are
endogenous than exogenous (as in many private sector models).  Furthermore, in the public sector
application, m itself need not create efficiency costs, whereas public sector entry barriers have the
dual marginal costs of maintenance βb and citizen loss of utility of freedom uf(1-b/y).  In contrast,
potential private sector entry barriers such as advertising, research and development, and vertical
restrictions (e.g., exclusive dealing) are often said to help enhance efficiency.  Thus, the main social
costs of noncompetitiveness are fundamentally different in the private and public sectors.
Measuring competitiveness in one or more of these ways is important because democracies
and nondemocracies have some obvious policy differences including torture, execution, and
censorship.  Furthermore, history has plenty of examples of nondemocracies’ pursuing reprehensible
policies, but this does not mean that democracies and nondemocracies always, or even usually, have
many different public policies.  The monopolistic competition model suggests that the “product mix
and design” – such as the composition of taxes, spending, and economic regulations – are functions
of economics and demographics, but not regime.  Although we do not deny that a dictator prefers
more money to less, the fact that his taking is limited by the threat of entry means that he has an
important reason to spend much of the tax revenue in the public interest: it buys him popular support
and thereby regime longevity.  Nondemocracies may collect more revenue, but they are not
leviathans.
If we are right that dictators are not leviathans, foreign policies designed to punish them may
have the unintended consequences of postponing regime change and lowering citizen’s incomes.
The fact that the value of governing is limited by competition, and not the technology of tax
collection, means that dictators are not 100% marginal claimants on government revenues and pass
on their punishments, at least in part, to citizens and competitors.  Punishing dictators conditional
on competitiveness can be more effective in terms of enhancing freedom, and to focus more of the
ultimate incidence of the punishment on the leadership rather than the citizens.  We suspect that, as
with anti-trust policy applied to the private sector, it matters exactly how “competitiveness” is
measured for the purpose designing foreign policies that promote democracy.  Future research canPolitical Competitiveness – 36
use a model like ours to compare and evaluate dictator punishments that are conditioned on b or c
or m or some other measure of political competitiveness.
Market power is more profitable in a large market than in a small one, and this insight
applies to the public sector as well.  Both efficiency and leadership incentives imply that
nondemocracies should take more steps to acquire people and territory, and that democracies should
not fight with each other.  The democratic peace literature interprets this behavior in terms of
democratic morals, or the incapacity of democratic leaders to make important decisions, but our
model suggests that a democratic peace might be observed even in the absence of these factors,
merely because of the economics of competitiveness.
Our model of dynamic political competition also has implications for recent political events
in oil countries in the wake of the large (and, potentially, largely permanent) oil price increases of
2004 and 2005.  These oil price increases should increase the net incomes of both citizens and
leaders in oil countries which, by itself, encourages challengers.  However, many oil countries had
already been among the less democratic countries in the world, and our model predicts further
increases in political entry barriers (and further losses of freedom) as a consequence of the increase
in the value of leading relative to the opportunity cost of challenging (see our Section V).  Higher
entry barriers tend to discourage challengers.  One exception may be Iraq where the value of leading
may someday be quite high due to the country’s oil assets, but the United States and its allies are
attempting to limit – with elections, press freedoms, etc. – political entry barriers.  Thus, regime
challengers are twice encouraged in Iraq – once by the expected future value of leadership and a
second time by political freedoms.  Perhaps attempts to grab power in Iraq would have been less
intense if the country’s oil assets had not gained so much value since 2003, or entry into the Iraqi
political process were as difficult as in neighboring nondemocratic countries.
VII.  Appendix I: Deadweight Costs and the Effect of Regime on General Public Spending
As shown by Hamilton (1986) and Becker and Mulligan (2003), one type of public spending
can crowd out another due to the deadweight costs of taxes, even when the spending is on transfers
and there would otherwise be no income effect.  For our purposes, this means that support is
nonseparable between x and my, because tax revenue for the leadership raises the marginal cost of
obtaining public revenue for other purposes.  The quantitative significance of this effect can bePolitical Competitiveness – 37
47The flypaper parameter can be derived from a model of public spending and deadweight
costs (as shown by Hamilton, Becker, and Mulligan), and its magnitude depends on the first and
second derivatives of deadweight costs, expressed as a function of tax collections.
calculated directly from a flypaper parameter θ 0 [0,1], namely the amount by which extra
government revenue is used to raise spending rather than cut taxes.
47  If the effect of autocracy on
m is ∆, then the effect on other public spending (as a fraction of y) is -θ∆, and the effect on total
taxes (including mNy) is (1-θ)∆.  Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) estimate (1-θ)∆ = 0.03,
since they find taxes in the most oppressive regimes’ to exceed taxes in the least oppressive regimes
by 3% of GDP.  If the typical flypaper effect estimate (see Hines and Thaler, 1995, for a survey) of
0.6 applies here, then (1-.6)∆ = 0.03, ∆ = 0.075, and θ∆ = 0.045.  On the other hand, Mulligan, Gil,
and Sala-i-Martin estimate various categories of nonmilitary public spending (like health, education,
pensions, and welfare) to be uncorrelated with democracy – the 0.03 tax difference can be attributed
almost entirely to military spending – which (given (1-θ)∆ = 0.03) may suggest that θ = 0, ∆ = 0.03,
and θ∆ = 0.  These estimates from the tax and spending sides of the budget give us a range for θ∆
0 [0,0.045].  Given that average spending in democracies is about 25% of GDP for the period 1960-
90, complete autocracy depresses government spending for the general public by 0 to 18%, which
might be neglected to a first approximation.
VIII.  Appendix II: Regime and Policy Horizons
According to a literal interpretation of our model, a leader’s expected remaining lifetime is
1/(ch), so that democratic leaders have short tenures by definition.  Turnover is indeed one (of many)
indicators of healthy competition.  Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) has found that nondemocratic
regimes last longer than democratic regimes.  Useful extensions of our model might recognize that
leaders face multiple threats to their tenure, some of which cannot be alleviated with popular
support.  For example, a leader may be threatened by foreign armies or other parties.
Another question is whether a leader’s policy horizon coincides with his expected tenure.
If so, and democracies have greater turnover, are democracies expected to be relatively short-sighted
in their policy choices?  In our model, even if a leader has a short expected lifetime, it does not mean
that he prefers public policies with short term benefits.  Our Proposition 1 says that he implements
policies that give him support; to a first approximation it is the horizon of the supporters that mattersPolitical Competitiveness – 38
48Recall that y is income per capita, m is the leadership’s “markup rate,” c is the number
of challengers, h is the success hazard of each challenger, and r is the interest rate.
for the public policy horizon.  Thus, the joint interests of citizens and incumbent leadership are
relevant.  Consider, for example, policies affecting the tax base y.  A dictator expecting to survive
1/(ch) periods obtains (per capita) revenue equal to my/(r+ch) in present value terms, while the
citizens retain (1-m)y/r.
48  That leaves [my/(r+ch)](ch)/r = my/[r(1+r/ch)] for all future leaders.  If
the future leaders have less influence on current policy than do citizens and incumbent leaders, and
m > 0, then current policy will excessively discount the future tax base.  However, the future leader
term my/[r(1+r/ch)] may or may not increase with democracy because democracies have less m but
shorter expected tenure for a given m.  Thus, while Hoppe (2001) and Olson (1991) conclude that
the public sector could be more efficient when ruled by dictatorship – because dictators are supposed
to have long horizons and c = 0 – our model with c > 0 suggests that more work is needed to fully
work out the relationship between competitiveness and policy horizons.Political Competitiveness – 39
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